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“Marxism” as Tradition in CCP Discourse
Abstract: This study discusses how the Chinese Communist Party has fashioned
“Marxism” as a tradition during the last three decades. I argue that its leaders
have invented the tradition of Sinicised Marxism by means of a ritualised
repetition that emphasises a largely factitious continuity with the purpose of
legitimising the Party, justifying policy changes and winning factional struggles.
The point is corroborated by an analysis of the invocation of “Marxism” during
key political phases in the reform era when the pretence of continuity became
crucial for the CCP, including 1978–1985, 1992–1995 and the Eighteenth Party
Congress of 2012. The article shows how, in the debates on “the criterion of
truth” and “Marxist humanism”, the reformists endorsed a re-definition of
Marxism that aimed at saving communism from radical Maoism and legitimising
the new policies. Next, I examine texts from the beginning of the second reform
period, when official propaganda strove to justify the roll-out of a market
economy by portraying “pragmatism” as the essence of Marxism. Finally, I
analyse how Party-state leaders have invoked Marxism around the time of the
last leadership transition. The article suggests that such a use of “Marxism” in
contemporary official discourse originates from Mao Zedong Thought as well as
in a gradual hollowing out of the concept. As a result it sheds light on the
ideological undertows of China’s contemporary socio-political history and on the
chances of future political change.
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1 Introduction
Since the Chinese Communist Party’s adoption of reform and opening up poli-
cies in 1978, scholars have described communism in the country as in decline,1
Giorgio Strafella, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of St. Gallen,
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1 Ding Xueliang 1994.
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on life support and showing a feeble pulse,2 and virtually defunct.3 This mainly
stems from the fact that while the CCP continues to legitimise its policies by
means of references to Marxism, thirty-seven years of reforms have made the
link between its policies and Marxist ideals less and less obvious.4 Even when
one refrains from describing the People’s Republic as a capitalist country, the
argument that justifies the economic reforms with “the theory of the beginning
stage of socialism”5 remains make-believe.6 One could even argue with Rancière
that “the domination of capitalism globally depends today on the existence of a
Chinese Communist party that gives de-localised capitalist enterprises cheap
labour to lower prices and deprive workers of the rights of self-organisation”.7
Reflecting on parallels between post-Mao China and post-Khrushchev USSR,
Carl Linden in 1990 observed that “from an energising force Marxism-Leninism
has petrified into a dogma that props up power structures that have lost their
reason for being”.8 In 2008 David Shambaugh described references to Marxism
in CCP discourse as “lip service”, arguing that the Party only needs to “feign
compliance” with the ideological canon in order to preserve its raison d’être as a
communist organisation while taking decisions on “non-ideological” grounds.9
Nevertheless, “Marxism” still features prominently in the official discourse
of a Party that remains highly concerned with “thought work”.10 The 2012 Party
Constitution affirms that the CCP “takes Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong
Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents
and the Scientific Outlook on Development as its guide to action”.11 “Marxism-
Leninism” occupies a higher level vis-à-vis the other items in this list. As the
Party Constitution specifies, Mao Zedong Thought “is Marxism-Leninism applied
and developed in China”; Deng Xiaoping Theory “represents a new stage of
development of Marxism in China, it is the Marxism of contemporary China”; the
2 Brugger/Kelly 1990: 1.
3 Zhou He 2009: 45.
4 E.g. Domes 1990: 195.
5 E.g. Gong Yuzhi 2010: 335.
6 Arif Dirlik wrote in 1989: “Chinese socialism justifies itself in terms of a historical vision that
has no apparent relevance to the present … The counterinsistence that China is a socialist
society headed for communism covers up under theoretical conventions a social situation that
distorts socialism out of recognisable form” (Dirlik 1989: 362).
7 In Jeffries 2012.
8 Linden 1990: 7.
9 Shambaugh 2008: 104–105.
10 See for instance “Document 9”, a communiqué circulated within the CCP by its General
Office in April 2013 (Mingjing yuekan 2013).
11 People.cn 2012a.
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Three Represents “is a continuation and development of Marxism-Leninism”,
and so on.12
When the Party enshrines a new formulation13 in its Constitution it stresses
its adherence to Marxism and claims that it represents the best application of
Marxism to China’s circumstances. This shows that Franz Schurmann’s observa-
tion that the CCP identifies Marxism as its universal theory and “pure ideology”
still holds true today. The other thoughts, theories and formulations belong
instead to the domain of “practical ideology”, i.e. they embody sets of ideas
derived from pure ideology and designed to provide “instruments for action”.14
Two main factors define the relation that the Party establishes between Marxism
and its practical ideology, namely “Sinisation” – i.e. adaptation to the “unique”
characteristics of China – and a Leninist insistence on the importance to analyse
and respond to concrete situations.
Why does Marxism play such a central and yet immaterial role in post-
reform official discourse? How has this role evolved? This article draws on
Hobsbawm’s concept of “invented tradition”15 in order to answer these ques-
tions. Eric Hobsbawm defined “invented tradition” as “a set of practices, nor-
mally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic
nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by
repetition, which automatically implies continuity” with “a suitable historic
past”.16 The peculiarity of invented traditions is that the continuity they attempt
to establish is “largely factitious”. They actually constitute “responses to novel
situations which take the form of reference to old situations” and represent the
attempt to structure parts of social life as “unchanging and invariant” in con-
trast to on-going change and innovation.17 This is why Hobsbawm expected
invented traditions to appear more frequently when a society undergoes a
rapid transformation that weakens or destroys existing social patterns,18 as in
12 People.cn 2012a. The Party Constitution also states that the “basic tenets” of Marxism-
Leninism “are correct and have tremendous vitality”.
13 Michael Schoenhals (1992) has highlighted the importance of ideological formulations (tifa
体法) in CCP discourse and noted how the Party “repeatedly stated that appropriate ones
contribute to the attainment of specific goals” (Schoenhals 1992: 8).
14 Schurmann 1968: 22. On the distinction between pure and practical ideology, and between
“theory” (lilun理论) and “thought” (sixiang思想), see esp. Schurmann 1968: 18–33. Despite the
use of the term “theory” for Deng Xiaoping’s contribution, this is also subordinate to
“Marxism”, as shown above.
15 See Hobsbawm/Ranger 1983 and in particular Hobsbawm 1983.
16 Hobsbawm 1983: 1.
17 Hobsbawm 1983: 2.
18 Hobsbawm 1983: 4.
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post-Mao China. Furthermore, as Barbara Misztal has noted, this occurs where
“dominant sectors of society” manipulate public notions of history “through
public commemorations, education systems, mass media and official records” in
order to suit their present interests and to legitimise their authority or new
institutions.19 This concept is therefore apt to investigate the above-mentioned
discrepancy between the policies and professed ideology of the CCP in the age of
reforms.
The present study argues that the leaders and ideological establishment of
the Party have fashioned “Marxism” as a tradition by means of a ritualised
repetition that emphasises a largely factitious continuity. By analysing texts
from three crucial phases of China’s recent history, this study shows how the
CCP has used the tradition of “Marxism” in order to legitimise its rule, justify
policy changes and wage factional struggles. It does not discuss the academic
discourse on Marxism in China,20 which is controlled by the Party, nor does it
look at the state of communism as a movement in the country.21
This study describes “Marxism” in CCP discourse as an invented tradition
based on the following considerations: (1) The value attributed to “Marxism”
rests on historical continuity more than on the intellectual content and political
aims of Marxism as a thought and an ideology; (2) This value is established and
emphasised by means of repetition, ritualised language and symbols; (3) The
continuity is largely factitious, as the Party employs “Marxism” with ever
increasing flexibility; (4) When CCP discourse invokes “Marxism” it obfuscates
the origins, evolution and differentiation of this concept.22 In this context, when
referring to “Marxism” one may hence distinguish three dimensions of the word:
(1) Marxism as thought, i.e. in its historical contexts and including a plurality of
19 Misztal 2003: 56–57. On the selective rendering of modern history and the politics of memory
under the CCP see e.g. Denton 2000 and Lee/Yang 2007. One can see Zhou Yang’s speech on the
hundredth anniversary of Karl Marx’s death in 1982 and Hu Jintao’s speech on the 110th birthday
of Mao Zedong as two instances of the relationship between historical commemoration and
“Marxism” as invented tradition in CCP discourse (see respectively People.cn 2011c and Hu
Jintao 2003).
20 See e.g. Kotz 2007.
21 For example, how communism may influence labour movements and organisations outside
the Party-state system. See: Conclusion.
22 For instance, during the reform era CCP leaders have repeatedly condemned the infiltration
of so-called western ideas, values and theories in China. One may point out that the CCP itself
was founded by intellectuals influenced by ideas from “the west” like Marxism, but official
discourse avoids codifying “Marxism” as western. Neither does it identify “Marxism” as
Chinese, otherwise its tenets would not need to be “Sinicised” (zhongguohua 中国化) by the
Party. This contributes to turning “Marxism” into an ahistorical fetish. On the contradiction
between Chinese exceptionalism and the “universality” of Marxism see Chongyi Feng 2012.
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contributions and interpretations; (2) Marxism as ideology, i.e. as “a thought
that is no longer thought”,23 as a worldview, a default reading of reality and a
dogma; and finally (3) “Marxism” as tradition. In the last sense “Marxism”
represents a thought that no longer can be thought, because it has lost its
content and its function consists in providing legitimacy by dint of continuity,
not in shaping a worldview or directing action.
By adducing Marxism to justify pro-market and pro-capitalist policies as well as
to legitimise deviations from the established Party line, CCP official discourse has
gradually hollowed out this concept and so effected a shift fromMarxism as ideology
to “Marxism” as tradition. In addition, references to Marxism as thought have
gradually vanished from such discourse. Party leaders and ideologues have invoked
“Marxism” especially when political rows, ideological re-positioning or leadership
change made the pretence of continuity important for the resilience of the regime.
The next sections examine the emergence of “Marxism” as tradition in three such
phases, namely the early years of the reform era (1978–1985), the beginning of the
second reform period (1992–1995) and the leadership transition of 2012.
2 Rescuing Marxism, 1978–1985
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 Marxism as the legitimising ideology of CCP
rule faced significant challenges. To begin with, Mao’s CCP had employed Marxism
to justify socio-economic policies that especially after 1958 had brought about
disastrous effects. After the Hundred Flowers movement (1956–1957) and especially
during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) Marxism became a bludgeon to beat
dissenters and fight rival factions.24 Furthermore, the CCP had turned Marxism-
Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought into a solid block of truth that could not be
reassessed without undermining its integrity and therefore the legitimacy of the
regime. The Maoists had this sacred but fragile golem on their side in the factional
struggle that followed the arrest of the Gang of Four in October 1976.25
23 Sartori 2009.
24 E.g. Feng Zhi et al. 1957. At the onset of the Cultural Revolution, on 5 June 1966, the People’s
Daily cited a new directive from Mao that provided the legitimising slogan of the movement:
“All the doctrines of Marxism, with its many theories and postulates, can be summed up in one
sentence: To rebel is justified” (see Lu, Xing 2004: 57).
25 At the Eleventh Congress of 1977 even Hua Guofeng attempted to distance himself from
Mao’s most radical ideas – with the pretext of eliminating the influence of the Gang of Four –
when he argued in favour of implementing the “four modernisations” within the framework of
the “continuous revolution” (Sullivan 1985: 76).
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The ideological orthodoxy established and discredited by the Party under
Mao constituted a formidable obstacle for the reformists. They would not and
could not discard Marxism as official ideology. In order to preserve Marxism and
with it a continuity with the revolutionary foundation of the Party’s claim to
power,26 however, Marxism had to be rescued from the Maoist era. In Marxism-
Leninism Mao particularly valued the ideas of “class struggle” and “dictatorship
of the proletariat”.27 Now a minority within the Party, led by Deng Xiaoping and
Hu Yaobang, aimed at redefining Marxism as the ideology of “pragmatism” – i.e.
reform policies that prioritised economic growth and technological develop-
ment28 – and greater political freedom.
The “controversy on the criterion of truth” of 1978–1980 was the first step in
this direction.29 The controversy began in May 1978 when Hu Yaobang and a
group of scholars at the Central Party School, which Hu headed, published an
editorial titled “Practice Is the Only Criterion to Ascertain Truth”.30 The authors,
writing anonymously, cited from Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach (1845), Mao and
Lenin to argue that there can be no Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought or
revolutionary theory if their application is not grounded in “practice”. The
editorial suggested that only empirical success can prove the validity of a
theory, including Marxism. Deng appeared to throw his weight behind Hu’s
group when on 2 June 1978 he gave a speech emphasising the importance of
“seeking truth from facts”31 – an ancient expression already adopted by Mao.32
A number of articles in support of “the practice criterion” followed, turning
the “controversy” into a campaign. On 24 June 1978 an editorial titled “A Most
Fundamental Principle of Marxism” appeared on the front page of Liberation
26 As A. James Gregor observes, Deng regularly insisted that his reform initiatives were
“Marxist”. “Such affirmations”, Gregor writes, “recommended themselves to a political leader
who sought to protect the integrity and continuity of the revolution to which he had devoted
himself and on whose orthodoxy he based his right to rule” (Gregor 2014: 212). Nonetheless,
since the first introduction of the reforms, “his socialism was seen by many as having only a
nominal historical affinity with the nineteenth century Marxism of Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels” as well as “no more than a selective”, “uncertain” connection with those of Lenin and
Mao Zedong (Gregor 2014: 219).
27 Wen-shun Chi 1986: 272–273.
28 Policy slogans emphasised the aim of improving people’s living conditions, as in Deng
Xiaoping’s “three-step” development strategy and the appropriation of the ancient concept of
xiaokang 小康 (e.g. Wong 1998: 211).
29 E.g. Schoenhals 1991 and Kluver 1996: 43–44. See also the texts in Kelly 1985.
30 Guangming ribao (“specially-appointed commentators of this paper”) 1978: 1.
31 Shi shi qiu shi 实事求是. Schoenhals 1991: 263–264.
32 Mao Zedong 1991[1938]. In this speech Mao exhorts Party members to “set an example in
seeking truth from facts” in the context of the anti-Japanese united front.
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Army Daily.33 The article confirmed that “Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong
Thought is irreversibly correct and must always be adhered to without the
least disobedience.” However, the authors also contended that mutated histor-
ical conditions required its principles to be “developed forward” and adapted,
because their correctness “must be proved through practice”. In other words, the
ideological banners and therefore the legitimacy of the CCP remained unques-
tionable, but the Party – which alone had the power to interpret them – could
adjust their content when politically advantageous.
By signalling that Marxism could be re-appropriated to suit reformist
intents, the “controversy on the criterion of truth” prepared the ground for the
debate on “Marxist humanism34” and alienation under socialism.35 The debate
originated from the heart of the ideological establishment. Advocates of a
“humanist” interpretation of Marxism included Wang Ruoshui, deputy editor
of the People’s Daily; Zhou Yang, a most powerful figure in the Propaganda
Department, the Chinese Writers Association and the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS); and Ru Xin, deputy head of the Philosophy Research Institute
at CASS and after 1982 vice-president of the Academy. Wang Ruoshui had
supported the “criterion of practice” campaign, stating in 1980 that Marxism
takes practice as “the foundation of knowledge”.36
The pro-humanist position expressed support for the reforms while conform-
ing to the “four cardinal principles” established by Deng in 1979.37 It suggested
that political persecution, irrational economic policies and the personality cult
of Mao brought about alienation in a socialist country, while the reforms could
heal this vulnus if inspired by Marxist humanism.38 Crucially, this position
stressed that only Marxism could inspire the solution for China’s ills while
dissociating it from thirty years of CCP rule. Even CASS president and former
secretary of Mao Zedong Hu Qiaomu, as he lashed out at this position, attempted
to redefine the ideology of the Party as a kind of humanism. Hu, while criticising
Wang Ruoshui’s standpoint as an attempt to poison Marxism with bourgeois
humanism, wrote of a “socialist humanism” compatible with Marxism and
embodied by the CCP.39
33 Jiefangjun bao 1978: 1.
34 Rendao zhuyi 人道主义.
35 See e.g. Beijing Daxue Zhexuexi 1984; Kelly 1985, 1987; Brugger/Kelly 1990: 139–170;
Sleeboom-Faulkner 2007: 73–75.
36 Wang Ruoshui 1985a: 92.
37 I.e. upholding the socialist path, upholding the people’s democratic dictatorship, upholding
the leadership of the CCP and upholding Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.
38 E.g. Zhou Yang 1983 and Wang Ruoshui 1985b.
39 Hu Qiaomu 1984.
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The debates on the “criterion of truth” and humanism re-defined the legit-
imising ideology of the CCP as compatible with a Party-state that downplayed
class struggle and emphasised a concern with the well-being of the people. In
search for a suitable definition of Marxism, the CCP intellectual and propaganda
establishment recovered dimensions of Marxism it previously denied.40 The
advocates of humanism and the “criterion of practice”, however, went beyond
re-legitimising Marxism and associating it with the reformists’ “pragmatism”.
They mentioned the taboo subject of labour conditions under CCP rule and
argued that Marxism calls for shattering ideological dogma. They even sug-
gested that non-Marxists might have valid points. Hence it does not surprise
that the debate ended with a campaign against “spiritual pollution” and the
dismissal of Wang Ruoshui from the People’s Daily. As the next section will
show, however, Wang’s above-mentioned views about practice, knowledge and
Marxism resonated during another key phase in the evolution of the CCP.
3 Marxism and pragmatism, 1992–1995
If Hu Qiaomu had a chance to define the CCP as the party of socialist humanism,
that chance died in Beijing on 4 June 1989. After the crackdown on the student
and labour movements and two years of economic retrenchment,41 Deng
Xiaoping, who no longer held any official position, returned at the centre of
Chinese politics in 1992 to sponsor a second phase of economic reforms. If the
reforms of the 1980s lacked a well-defined blueprint and compromised between
market and plan, the “deep reforms” heralded by Deng’s Southern Tour set the
establishment of a “socialist market economy” as the goal.42 In November 1993
the CCP adopted policy guidelines that outlined the reform of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), price reform and China’s further integration into the global
economy,43 which eventually culminated in the country’s accession to the World
Trade Organisation in 2001. The effects of the new reforms included the lay-off of
more than twenty-eight million SOE workers between 1993 and 2003.44 In his
widely publicised Southern Tour speech, Deng proclaimed:
40 For instance, in 1963 Zhou Yang made a famous speech at the Chinese Academy of Sciences
in which he denounced those who linked Marxism with humanism as reactionary (see Brugger
et al. 1990: 148).
41 Lam 1995; Baum 1994: 313–340.
42 Liu/Dittmer 2006.
43 Zhonggong Zhongyang 1993.
44 Naughton 2007: 186.
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In studying Marxism-Leninism we must grasp the essence and learn what we need to
know. Weighty tomes are for a small number of specialists; how can the masses read
them? … [Marxism cannot be defeated] because it is the irrefutable truth. The essence of
Marxism is seeking truth from facts. That is what we should advocate, not book worship.45
While the debates of the 1980s still cited the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin,
Deng here divorces “Marxism” from Marxism. By dissuading from “book wor-
ship” Deng is asking to avoid enquiring into whether justification for the reforms
can be found in the Marxist canon. The masses should instead purchase, sight
unseen, both “Marxism” and the ideological legitimacy of CCP rule. Further in
this speech Deng adds that Marxism “is a very plain thing, a very plain truth”
without explaining what this truth might be. He then reassures his audience:
“Do not panic. Do not think that Marxism had disappeared, that it is not useful
anymore and that it has been defeated. Nothing of the sort!”46 Deng also
stressed that the achievements of reform and opening up – which he cited to
justify the 1989 crackdown – came from relying on “practice”, not on “books”.
As he launched a new wave of reforms Deng Xiaoping thus emptied Marxism of
its content and reduced it to the banner of “Marxism”.
Between 1992 and 1995 an intensive media campaign promoted the message of
Deng’s 1992 speech. In July 1992 an article appeared on the first page of the
Guangming Daily titled “Seeking Truth from Facts Is the Essence of Marxism”.
The long editorial repeated Deng’s favourite sound bites: practice is the only
criterion of truth; the achievements of reform and opening up are based on
practice not books; Marxism originates from practice; and so on. The article
explains Deng’s ideological formulation “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”
as meaning “to uphold Marxism under new historical conditions” and “develop-
ing” Marxism. It describes Marxism as “always contemporary” and “always devel-
oping”. The article also claims that the way in which the Party upheld and
developed Marxism proves that Marxism “essentially means seeking truth from
facts”. Particular emphasis is placed on the identity between Marxism and the
ideology of the CCP, and between the history of the Party – especially after the
Third Plenum of 1978 and under Deng’s leadership – and the history of Marxism.
The author provides “Marxism” with little content besides that it is said to change
with the times and to originate from practice.47 This article and its rhetorical use of
45 Deng Xiaoping 1992. One wonders whether, while pronouncing these words, Deng thought
of the Central Committee Circular No. 4 of 1976, where Mao accused him of not reading books,
being “ignorant about Marxism-Leninism” and being unable “to distinguish between Marxism
and imperialism” (see Schoenhals 1991: 249–250).
46 Deng Xiaoping 1992.
47 Li Hongfeng 1992: 1–2.
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“Marxism” is representative of the political campaign that accompanied the roll-
out of the market reforms.48
A 1993 speech at the Central Party School by Ding Guangen, head of the
Central Propaganda Department, helps to clarify the strategy. In the published
summary of the speech Ding declares that Party propaganda and thought work
“under the new circumstances” must aim at establishing “Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics”. This formulation, he explained, constitutes the second
important application of Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese context after Mao
Zedong Thought. Mao taught us to “preserve and develop” Marxism with new
ideas towards the victory of socialism, he reasoned; now that the Party is armed
with both Mao Zedong Thought and “socialism with Chinese characteristics” this
victory is closer. Party propaganda must therefore advance the study of how
Deng Xiaoping has examined China’s new situation and solved its most recent
problems by employing a Marxist worldview and method.49
At the onset of the far-reaching economic reforms of 1990s, the CCP especially
stressed the “continuity and development” of Marxism under Deng Xiaoping’s
leadership. Compared with the campaigns of the 1980s, the link between
Marxism and the use of “Marxism” to claim ideological consistency despite policy
changes was greatly reduced, thus hollowing out the meaning of the word. Deng
himself, as shown above, suggested to refrain from seeking a rationale for the new
policies in the actual content of Marxism as a thought, and trust the value of
“Marxism” instead. In addition, the fear induced by the events of 1989 arguably
persuaded Chinese intellectuals – i.e. the “small number of specialists” to which
Deng referred– to refrain from such a pursuit. Consequently Marxism was no
longer re-defined for the sake of continuity, as in the debates of the 1980s, but
continuity in the use of the banner of “Marxism” became valued per se. The Party
employed this pretence of continuity to legitimise the post-1992 combination of
economic liberalisation and political repression that it preserves to this day.
4 The 2012 leadership transition
In 1985 Deng Xiaoping famously said that some should be allowed to “get rich
first” so they would then “spur and help” others “gradually achieve common
prosperity”.50 Twenty years after the Southern Tour, as the Eighteenth Party
48 See e.g. Guangming ribao 1992, 1993; Liu Ji 1993.
49 Ding Guangen 1993: 3.
50 People.cn 2006.
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Congress elected a new Politburo led by the son of Deng’s ally Xi Zhongxun,
some had indeed got richer. The China Household Finance Survey51 (CHFS)
found that in 2011 the top five per cent households in total income controlled
44 per cent of the national income and owned 61.6 per cent of the country’s
household savings. Economists have estimated that nearly USD 4 trillion in
assets flowed from China to tax havens between 2000 and 2011.52 Moreover,
investigative reports have revealed that family members of the Party’s highest
echelons have accumulated sizeable riches and, with the help of western banks,
made use of offshore companies to hide them.53 High socio-economic inequality
and the illicit use of official positions undermine the legitimacy of CCP rule and
the Party leadership is aware of this.
In the run-up to the Eighteenth Congress, Guangdong Party Secretary Wang
Yang was seen as a champion of free-market economic policies and political
reforms.54 In a speech pronounced two months before the Congress, Wang
stressed the importance to “unwaveringly uphold [the principle of] seeking truth
from facts.”55 The speech cites pronouncements from Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin
and Hu Jintao in which the former CCP leaders describe Marxism as a theory that
“evolves with time” and “develops and expands with practice”. Stressing the
continuity between his view and those of Deng, Jiang and Hu, Wang Yang
deduces from these quotations that one should not think of Marxism as “a stiff
and empty dogma”, but rather as a living theory that stems and evolves with
“practice”.56 Wang Yang’s references to “Marxism” – like Jiang Zemin’s and Hu
Jintao’s – have little to do with Marxism as thought and ideology, aiming instead
at portraying the pursuit of further reforms as consistent with the Party’s history.
The development of “Marxism” to which Wang Yang refers means the develop-
ment of the party line,57 but referring to “Marxism” instead of “party line” conveys
the moot but important message that the CCP’s de facto neglect of Marxist ideals
is not a break with the Party’s tradition. The legitimacy of the reforms is again
grounded not on their conformity with the avowed ideology of the Party, but on
factitious historical continuity.
In November 2012 Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping stressed the necessity to uphold
Marxism and “sinicise” it. At the Congress Hu described his own contribution to
51 This survey was conducted by the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
(China) and Texas A&M University (US) (Li Gan 2013).
52 Kar, Dev/Freitas, and Sarah 2012.
53 E.g. Barboza 2012; Bloomberg News 2012; Ball 2013.
54 Jacobs 2012; Cheng Li 2012.
55 Wang Yang 2012.
56 Wang Yang 2012.
57 See Tonglin Lu 1993: 192 on “Marxism” as a metaphor of the party line.
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the ideological pillars of the Party, the Scientific Outlook on Development, as
“created by integrating Marxism with the reality of contemporary China and with
the underlying features of our times” and “fully embodying the Marxist world-
view and method with regards to development”.58 In other words, there would
be no Scientific Outlook without Marxism and the Outlook itself would lack
legitimacy if Marxism were not accepted as the sole correct ideology.
During his first Party study session as paramount leader, Xi Jinping said:
The theoretical system of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics is the most recent among the
achievements in the Sinisation of Marxism, which also include Deng Xiaoping Theory, the
important thought of the “Three Represents” and the Scientific Outlook on Development.
[These achievements] have a relation of upholding/developing and continuing/innovating
with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. We definitely should not lose Marxism-
Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, because by losing them we would lose our roots.59
This extract shows that Xi considers upholding Marxism-Leninism as necessary
for the Party in order to preserve a continuity with its past and justifies post-Mao
formulations as the result of the Sinisation of Marxism carried out by the CCP.
With regards to Marxism, Hu and Xi stress continuity and “Chineseness”
while somehow downplaying the themes of “further developing”60 and “seeking
truth from facts”. Another element shared by their speeches is the reference to
Marxism as a faith. Hu Jintao at the Eighteenth Congress stated:
First of all, we must strengthen ideals and beliefs and hold fast to the spiritual aspirations
of a communist. The faith in Marxism and belief in socialism and communism are the
political soul of a communist, they are the spiritual mainstay that a communist relies on
through every ordeal.61
Nine days later Xi Jinping repeated the last sentence verbatim in his speech.62
While they are not the first leaders of the CCP to ask Party members to believe in
Marxism, words from the semantic field of spirituality like “faith” and “soul” in
58 Hu Jintao 2012.
59 Xi Jinping 2012. In Chinese, sangshi genben 丧失根本. Although the first meaning of
“genben” is “roots” (both literally and metaphorically), one could also translate the phrase as
“lose the fundamentals”.
60 Xi Jinping for instance spoke of “preserving (baochi保持) and developing” Marxism, which
is more conservative than the common phrasing, “upholding (jianchi坚持) and developing”. He
also appears to interpret “developing Marxism” mainly as “furthering the Sinicisation of
Marxism” (see e.g. People.cn, 2010, 2011a).
61 Hu Jintao 2012.
62 Xi Jinping 2012. It should be noted that Xi Jinping did not adopt the association Marxism-
faith from Hu Jintao’s speech, having already written extensively on Chinese Marxism from the
viewpoint of faith in 2011. See e.g. People.cn 2011b.
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this context suggest a disposition antithetical to the study of Marxism as a
thought (see above) and a further fetishisation of “Marxism”. Based on a
comparison between Wang Yang’s words and Xi’s one may speculate that
references to “developing” Marxism signal a pro-reform standpoint, while refer-
ences to “faith” in Marxism a more “leftist” (i.e. conservative) one. The stress on
sticking to political orthodoxy “through every ordeal” also suggests the leaders’
determination in preserving unity within Party ranks.
CCP leaders also contradict their own exhortations to “uphold Marxism”
when they avoid discussing national and global socio-economic issues in terms
of class relations and means of production, rhapsodising instead about “mod-
ernisation” and the nationalistic “Chinese Dream”. This shows how Marxism as
an ideology has largely deserted the actual worldview of the CCP as a ruling
party.63 To conclude, as the distance between the ideals of Marxism and policy-
making grows, references to “Marxism” by CCP leaders have become more
empty and formulaic, and the value of “Marxism” as tradition has grown as
opposed to the role of Marxism as thought and ideology.
5 Conclusion
This study has shown how Marxism in post-Mao CCP discourse has shifted from
the role of ideology to the role of “invented” tradition, in that its value rests on a
factitious continuity between the Party’s past and present, rather than its con-
tents. Through a series of political campaigns aimed at buttressing its legitimacy
to rule, the CCP has gradually hollowed out “Marxism” at the very same time as
it claimed to “uphold” it. Deprived of its historical and intellectual complexity,
“Marxism” continues to feature prominently in Party discourse through ritua-
lised and formulaic language, a symbol of political orthodoxy and ideological
infallibility more than anything else.
While this use of “Marxism” has mainly stemmed from the need to justify
changes in the Party line, it may also be rooted in a peculiar aspect of Mao
Zedong’s thought. For Mao, as Nick Knight observes, Marxism constituted a
universal theory representing a scientific reflection of objective reality. At the
same time Mao believed that one must derive the laws that govern reality by
moving from the particular to the general. Therefore, while all real knowledge
63 As far as economic policies are concerned, it is worth remembering that “in the last decade
major debates among economic and financial policy makers have no longer been about whether
the economy should be primarily a socialist or a market one, but about what would be most
effective policy to secure sustained and sustainable rapid growth” (Tsang 2009).
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derives from practical experience, only Marxism can correctly interpret the
reality that is the object of such an experience.64 What Knight views as an
“unresolved contradiction” in Mao’s methodological approach may have opened
the door to the highly flexible use of “Marxism” by post-1978 CCP leaders and to
the way the Party justifies this use with “pragmatism”.
This study has also pointed at potential areas of further research, such as
the relation between the use of “Marxism” by Party leaders and the academic
study of Marxism in the People’s Republic. Another question worth exploring is
the relation between “Marxism” as a political tradition and China’s traditions as
endorsed and politicised by the CCP. This is probably a relation of subordina-
tion, as evidenced by the following quote from a recent People’s Daily editorial
on “Establishing a System to Preserve and Propagate Outstanding Traditional
Culture”: “The Party and the government must fully play their role in guiding
accurate work on traditional culture, using Marxism as the guiding principle.”65
Finally, one wonders: Can Marxism inspire a new communist labour movement
in China? The findings of Ngai and Chan’s and Solinger’s studies on class con-
sciousness among Chinese workers suggest that such a movement, although not
impossible, will not happen soon.66 However, the China Labour Bulletin recorded a
total of 1,312 strikes and other labour protests in China between November 2013 and
November 2014.67 If enabled and organised, the Chinese labour force would repre-
sent a more formidable threat to CCP rule than foreign armies and dissent among
intellectuals. The “instructions” for this to take place are not found in banned
books, censored websites or western media, but in the canon of the very ideology
the CCP claims to embody and worship. Hence the Chinese Communist Party may
be deriving an additional benefit from retaining the monopoly in the interpretation
of Marxism while hollowing out the meaning of this word.
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